

FOOTNOTES

YEAR	ISSUE	DIA	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	OTHER
1959	Goal of Soviet ICBM program: substantial deterrent and preemptive attack capability			Real objective of Soviet ICBM program is decisive military superiority -- total deterrence		
	Size of Soviet ICBM force: number on launchers in mid-1962 and mid-1963: mid-1962: 325-450 (inventory) 250-350 (launchers) mid-1963: 450-560 (inventory) 350-450 (launchers)			Believes higher number of ICBMs in mid-1962 and mid-1963: mid-1962: 500 (inventory) 385 (launcher) mid-1963: 800 (inventory) 640 (launcher)		NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.
	Size of Soviet heavy bomber fleet, mid-1960 to mid-1964: heavy: 135,150,140,130,120 medium: 1,100/1,050/1,000/900/800		Believes estimate too high for heavies: estimates 125/115/100/75/75	Believes estimate too low for heavies: estimates 135/150/175/200/200		
1960	Soviet series production of ICBMs probably began in early 1959		Believes conclusion misleading in that it may be interpreted to imply that ICBMs for operational deployment or inventory started to become available in 1959			
	Soviet initial ICBM operational capability with a few series produced missiles as of 1 Jan 1960		Believes as of 1 Jan 1960, Soviets had only an emergency capability to launch an ICBM against North America			Insufficient information to judge that as of 1 Jan 1960 conditions for IOC had been met

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FOOTNOTES ON SIGNIFICANT ISSUES

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1960	Insufficient direct evidence to establish scale and pace of present Soviet ICBM production and deployment program		Much of this evidence constitutes negative indications and that its rejection as insufficient leads to unrealistic overestimation.			
	Soviet incentives to build an ICBM force -- terms of deterrence and preemptive or retaliatory attack				Believes the USSR would not be content with conceptual levels of preemptive attack and deterrence	
	Existence of operational factors which would tend to reduce Soviet confidence in their ability, with any given number of ICBMs, to destroy or neutralize US retaliatory forces through attack on fixed installations		Believes that operational considerations which extend beyond computations of number of ICBMs required to inflict severe damage on certain static targets, would prohibit Soviet military planners from accepting that a certain number of ICBMs would be sufficient to reduce weight of a US retaliatory attack to an acceptable level			
	Projected tentative estimate beyond 1963: none made				Believes an estimate beyond 1963 can be made.	
	Size of Soviet bomber and tanker force				Believes estimates of bombers/tankers should be larger.	
	Launchers for ballistic missiles				Believes each operational launcher	

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1961	Reasonably good evidence of a minimum number of 2 to 4 operational ICBM site complexes		Evidence supporting existence of such sites tenuous rather than reasonably good insofar as ICBM associated deployment activities are concerned	Reasonably good evidence to support existence of 10-15 operational ICBM site complexes	Evidence supporting existence of such sites tenuous rather than reasonably good insofar as ICBM associated deployment activities are concerned	✓
	Pace and force levels of operational ICBM launchers: 50-100 in mid-1961. (Position of Army, Air, Navy, and State contained in Annex C to estimate)		Only a few operational launchers deployed in mid-1961; program paced more slowly through mid-64 (150-300)	Believes more operational launchers in mid-1961 and increased pace through mid-1964 (850)	Only a few operational launchers deployed in mid-1961; program paced more slowly through mid-64 (150-300)	STATE Believes estimate should show largest number they (Soviets) could have in mid-61, and probable range through mid-1964.
	ICBM force goals for 1965-1966			1,150 operational launchers in 1965; 1,450 in 1966		
	Medium range ballistic missiles (700 and 1,100 n.m.) phasedown as 2,000 n.m. missile is built up		Soviet planners may decide on lower force goals rather than a phasedown of 700 and 1,100 n.m. missile inventories			
	Estimates of long range aviation force: 150 heavy bombers/tankers (mid-1961)			Estimates mid-1961, 175 heavy bombers/tankers		
	Estimate of about 200 bombers Soviets could put over North America on two-way missions in initial attack			Estimates about 300 bombers over North America on two-way missions in initial attack		
	Overall Soviet capability to attack the US with ICBMs: With estimated current force of 50-100 operational ICBM launchers, USSR would already be capable of bringing major US cities under attack		Overall Soviet capability to attack the US with ICBMs is at present extremely limited (mid-1961)		Overall Soviet capability to attack the US with ICBMs is at present extremely limited (not able to bring as many as 25 major US cities under attack)	

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1962	Tempo of ICBM program has quickened: mid-63: 125-175 launchers mid-64: 200-300 launchers		Believes number of Soviet ICBM launchers unlikely to exceed low side of ranges for mid-63 and mid-64	Estimates operational launchers as: mid-62: 75-100 mid-63: 175-250 mid-64: 300-450		
	Size of mid-1962 ICBM force: 50 operational launchers			Estimates 75-100 operational launchers, mid-1962		
	Hardening at Tyuratam and at deployment sites		Believes evidence concerning hardening is insufficient to determine nature of installations involved			
	Estimated force levels to 1964: mid-62: 50 launchers mid-63: 125-175 launchers mid-64: 200-300 launchers		Believes estimate too high: mid-62: about 50 mid-63: 100-125 mid-64: 150-200	Believes estimate too low: mid-62: 75-100 mid-63: 175-250 mid-64: 300-450		
	Estimated strength of Long Range Aviation: 1962-1964 Heavy bombers mid-62: 165 mid-63: 165 mid-64: 150			Believes estimate too low: mid-62: 200 mid-63: 200 mid-64: 200		
	Soviets could put about 200 bombers over North America on 2-way missions in initial attacks			Believes Soviets could put about 300 bombers over North America on 2-way missions in initial attacks		
	Soviet ICBM force level in mid-1967: within range of 300-600 operational launchers		Believes estimate is too high: within range of 250-425 operational launchers	Believes estimate is too low: within range of 700-800 operational launchers		

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1962	Heavy Bomber Forces: reduced to about 100 aircraft by mid-1967			Estimates that mid-1967 heavy bomber strength will be 200 aircraft		
1963	Estimate of operational ICBM launchers as of 1 October 1963: 105-120			Believes estimate too low: estimates 145-160 ICBM launchers		
	Estimate of ICBM launchers operational in mid-1964 and mid-1965: mid-64: 205-235; mid-65: 250-350			Believes estimate too low: estimates mid-64: 215-250 mid-65: 300-350		
	SS-8 missile comparable in payload capacity to SS-7		Believes that a confident selection between possible SS-8 delivery capabilities cannot be made at this time	Believes that a confident selection between possible SS-8 delivery capabilities cannot be made at this time		
	Long Range Aviation: (mid-1965) 170-200 heavies/tankers 825-925 mediums/tankers			Believes estimate too low: estimates (mid-1965) 200 heavies/tankers 925-1025 mediums/tankers		
	Manned aircraft threat to continental US.: 90-115 bombers over US on two-way missions			Believes number of air- craft, including Badgers on one-way missions, would exceed 500		
	Soviet operational ICBM force by mid-1969: some 400-700 operational ICBM launchers			Believes Soviet ICBM force by mid-1969 could range from 600-1000 operational ICBM launchers	Believes force level likely to be on low side (400)	
	Long Range Bombers: By 1969, declined to about 130-175 heavies and 400-650 mediums			Believes estimate too low: estimates by 1969, heavy bombers will remain at 200 and medium bombers will include about 900		

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1964	Size of operational ICBM program: mid-1964: about 200 mid-1965: low side of 250-350 Estimate does not believe Soviets are attempting to deploy a force capable of a first-strike which would reduce effects of U.S. retaliation to an acceptable level Hardness of Soviet ICBM sites: 300-600 psi range; design overpressure in the 200-400 psi range Estimated Soviet ICBM force for mid-1970: 400-700 operational ICBMs; 300-575 aiming points Long Range Bomber Force: mid-1970 will probably include 140-180 heavy bombers 300-500 medium bombers, mostly Blinders Soviets at present could put up to 150 Badgers over North American target areas on two-way missions			Believes estimate too low; estimates mid-1964: about 240 mid-1965: 275-325 Considers that Soviets may already have directed intensive military R&D toward achievement of effective first-strike counterforce capability before close of this decade Believes no meaningful estimate of hardness of Soviet hard sites can be made. Design overpressure no greater than 100-300 psi previously estimated. Believes estimate too low; estimates for mid-1970 600-900 operational ICBMs; 400-700 aiming points Believes estimate too low; estimates that heavy bomber force will remain at about 200 or somewhat larger; medium bomber/tanker force will probably still include about 650-850 aircraft Estimates number of heavy and medium bombers, including Badgers on one-way mission, could exceed 500		

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1965	Continuance of Soviet adherence to concept of deterrent force			Intensive Soviet military R&D effort raises possibility that Soviets already are focusing on achievement of a strategic superiority		
	Estimated ICBM launcher spread for mid-1975: 500-1,000 operational launchers	Does not concur in high side of estimated ICBM launcher spread for mid-1975; believes it to be too high		Estimates Soviet ICBM force in 1975 will include at least 1,000 operational launchers and could well be above that figure	Does not concur in high side of estimated ICBM launcher spread for mid-1975; believes it to be too high	
	Bomber Force, Long Range Aviation: 200 heavy bombers 800 medium bombers No follow-on heavy bomber. By 1975, heavy bomber force reduced to about 50; medium to some 250-500, comprised largely of Blinders			Soviets will introduce a follow-on heavy bomber into Long Range Aviation. By 1975, LRA will contain 125-200 heavies and 450-600 mediums		
1966	Concept of deterrence and retaliatory capability; no deliberate initiation of general war			Continuing Soviet dissatisfaction with posture of strategic inferiority vis-a-vis US, and determination to eliminate such inferiority		
	Soviet ICBM force: mid-1971: 800-1,100 operational launchers mid-1976: 800-1,200 operational launchers			Believes estimate too low: estimates force of some 1,000-1,200 by 1970-71; by mid-70s, upwards of 1,200 and perhaps 1,500 launchers if no MIRV capability		
	Soviet missile submarine strength					NSA: disagrees on Soviet missile submarine strength

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	Strategic bomber force LRA: 950-1,000 bomber/ tankers, 200-210 of which are heavies and rest are mediums. By 1976: 70-100 heavies 300-500 mediums Soviets could put about 100 heavy bombers over US targets on two-way missions			Soviets could put as many as 400 heavy and medium bombers over US target areas. Likely to introduce follow-on heavy and new medium bomber into LRA. By 1976, 200 heavy bombers, 400-600 medium bombers		
1967	ICBMs: mid-72: more than 1,000, not likely to exceed 1,300 mid-77: more than 1,000, not likely to exceed 1,500 Long Range Aviation: No new follow-on heavy bomber. Reduction of heavy bombers by mid-70s; medium bombers composed largely of supersonic dash Blinder			Estimates in mid-1970s: more than 1,000; not likely to exceed 1,500 if missiles with MRV have been operationally deployed. A program which added only 100 launchers per year beyond those identified would exceed 1,700 by 1977 USSR likely to introduce into LRA both a follow-on heavy bomber and a new medium bom- ber. By mid-1970s, LRA will include about 200 heavy bombers and some 400-600 medium bombers		